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Societies in transition from an economy integrated by socialist redistribution to an 
economy integrated by capitalist markets provide an exciting site to study the most 
interesting theoretical questions about poverty. This paper examines these issues 
in five countries in Central and Southern Europe, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovakia. During the past decade, there has been dramatic change in 
these countries. All have moved towards a market economy in some respects. In 
some of these countries, marketization has been very rapid. At the same time, 
however, poverty has increased in all Of these countries. In this paper, we offer 
some hypotheses about the relationship between poverty, markets, and ethnicity in 
these countries and provide some preliminary evidence to examine these 
hypotheses. We hope that this paper serves as the starting point for a much fuller 
treatment of these issues.
A. Poverty, Markets, and Redistribution
To define our theoretical puzzle, we draw on the distinction between neoclassical 
economists and traditional institutionalists. These two positions provide opposing 
views concerning the origins of poverty. They also recommend strikingly different 
policies to eliminate poverty. For decades - during the ideological hegemony of 
traditional institutionalism - the received wisdom among social scientists was that 
unregulated markets were the primary sources of poverty. Welfare redistribution 
by governments was necessary to reduce poverty (Polanyi 1944; Townsend 1970) 
whether it was defined in either relative or absolute terms. During the past few 
decades, however, neoclassical economists began to question these assumptions. 
They argued that unconstrained markets generate rapid economic growth that 
eventually benefits the bottom of social hierarchy. Neoclassical economists believe 
that welfare redistribution offers no cure for poverty; it only suppresses the 
symptoms and prolongs the disease. Governmental welfare redistribution locks the 
poor into welfare dependency and usually supports the middle class because it does 
not reach those in extreme poverty anyway. Thus, poverty will be reproduced 
indefinitely unless the poor take responsibility for their own welfare (Hayek 1944, 
1960; Stigler 1970; Friedman and Friedman 1980).
Kuznets (1955) offered a theory that was consistent with the neoclassical 
position, but posed the relationship between economic growth and social inequality 
in a more complex way. He analyzed income distribution data over a long period 
of time using countries with different levels of economic development. He 
concluded that income inequality increased during an economic take-off, but that 
inequality declined after economic growth reached a certain level. Thus, the 



























































































by an inverted U-shaped curve. Assuming that free markets produce the fastest 
possible economic growth, especially in highly developed economies, Kuznets’s 
theory suggests that the expansion of markets may initially increase inequality. By 
implication, poverty, at least in relative terms, will also increase. Even an increase 
in absolute poverty is not unimaginable from this theoretical perspective. 
Eventually, however, free markets will correct the socially undesirable effects of 
economic growth. Markets will reduce inequality, thereby reducing not only 
absolute, but also relative poverty.
In a recent comparative study of inequality and poverty, Lai and Myint 
(1996) formulated the question of the relationship between equality, poverty, and 
economic growth in a particularly clear and provocative way. They found that 
income distributions in the core capitalist countries of the world during the past 
quarter of century did not follow the pattern observed by Kuznets. In particular, 
inequalities in Western Europe and North America increased during the last 
decades of the twentieth century. Lai and Myint (1966) found that economic 
growth did not necessarily reduce inequality, but they did find evidence that 
economic growth reduced absolute poverty. Thus, free markets and economic 
growth may produce greater inequality, but they may reduce absolute poverty.
B. Poverty and the Underclass
Our central analytic issue is whether economic growth and marketization eliminate 
absolute poverty. We realize that social inequality is a serious problem, but we 
focus on underclass formation, and therefore, on absolute poverty. Thus, we arrive 
at the problem of the tricky and often debated definition of the underclass. We 
return to the concept as it was originally used in the 1960s and early 1970s. As far 
as we can tell, the term underclass was coined by Myrdal (1962, 1964), who used 
it to designate the unique position of the long-term poor, who were not benefiting 
from the post-war economic boom. These individuals were locked into long-term 
structural unemployment because they did not have, and could not acquire, the 
education and skills demanded in a diversified economy. We believe that William 
Julius Wilson (1978) intended to use the term this way (Aponte 1990), though he 
may not have been entirely clear, as he sometimes shifted between an economic 
and behavioral definition of the underclass. Here, we simply highlight that Wilson 
expanded Myrdal's notion of underclass in useful ways, by moving away from an 
economically deterministic understanding of the underclass and by bringing the 
issue of racism into his analysis. Drawing on Wilson's innovation, our own 
perspective, inspired by Bourdieu, combines a focus on the objective problems of 




























































































of ethnicity and gender to predict when sharp distinctions are drawn between the 
"hopelessly poor" and the "deserving poor".
Thus, we define the underclass in terms of the objective life chances of its 
members. The underclass is constituted by those individuals who a) are locked into 
long-term unemployment, b) are likely to remain unemployed and poor for their 
entire life because of their lack of education and marketable skills, and c) whose 
children are likely to be trapped in similar social positions. These individuals are 
separated from the rest of society by a caste-like cleavage; members of the 
underclass become the "untouchables", the "undeserving poor", or the "no-hopers." 
In the next section, we argue that an underclass is likely to form in conjunction with 
the presence of certain social characteristics, and in particular, ethnicity or gender.
C. Underclass Formation around Ethnicity and Gender?
All evidence at our disposal indicates that during the transition from socialist 
redistribution to capitalist markets both absolute and relative poverty increased. 
Within this empirical context, we formulate our hypotheses by drawing on the 
neoclassical and institutionalist perspectives. As market institutions become 
consolidated in former post-communist countries, will absolute poverty decline, 
following a "Lai and Myint" curve, as neoclassical theory predicts, or will the poor 
reproduce themselves unless the government intervenes as institutionalists predict?
We propose a novel solution to this debate: It depends! Whether poverty will 
be reproduced under the conditions of well-functioning markets depends on the 
social characteristics of the cleavages that separate the poor from the not-so-poor 
and on the social characteristics of markets. We focus on two mechanisms - 
racialization and feminization - that can reproduce poverty. Poverty may become 
racialized or feminized when ethnic minorities or women are overrepresented 
among the poor. This overrepresentation is a necessary, but insufficient condition. 
Racialization and feminization occur when a social phenomenon - here poverty - 
is attributed to supposedly ascribed characteristics of actors. If the racialization or 
feminization of poverty is successful, the cleavage between the poor and the not-so- 
poor becomes rigid and social actors perceive this cleavage as natural, created by 
the "laws of nature." The outcome is that the resultant poverty is durable and long 
term. It is likely to be transmitted to the next generation.
Social scientists who interpret this phenomenon have to navigate between the 
Scylla of "objectivism" and the Charybdis of "subjectivism". Objectivism in this 




























































































because of certain objective, unalterable attributes of that ethnic group or gender. 
Subjectivism on the other hand would imply that ethnicity and gender have nothing 
to do with poverty; the fact that the poor are ethnic minorities or women is purely 
a subjective assessment by social actors.
Our conceptualization lies between these two positions. With respect to the 
concentration of ethnic minorities in poverty, we argue that the racialization of 
poverty is the outcome of a classificatory struggle. If this classificatory struggle is 
successful, a social phenomenon - poverty - is presented as if it were racial, not 
social, and therefore, as if it were genetically and biologically determined. From 
this perspective, racialization arises from a strategy used by the positively 
privileged ethnic group to keep themselves out of the category "poor" and/or to 
blame the poor for their own poverty at the same time. ("1 cannot be poor, since I 
am not African-American or Gypsy" or "They are poor since they are African- 
Americans or Gypsies. It is their biological heritage or culture that makes them 
poor.") Our conceptualization of racialization is similar to Miles's position (1982). 
He argues that social actors in structurally similar social, economic, or geographic 
positions to ethnic minorities are likely to use race to separate themselves from 
these minorities. Understood this way, racialization implies a classificatory 
struggle: The social actors who are involved in struggles to define poverty as a 
racial issue pursue a specific agenda.
As actors pursue this agenda, of course, they construct reality. Nevertheless, 
they do so in reference to reality. In the absence of an ethnicity that is amenable to 
racialization, attempts to racialize a cleavage will fail. There are indeed some 
dispositions that increase the likelihood of successful racialization. These 
dispositions are historically variable: At one time they may be sufficient to create 
a sharp cleavage between the poor and the not-so-poor; at another time, they may 
not serve this purpose. For example, being Jewish may have been an ethnicity 
around which to racialize poverty a hundred years ago in Eastern Europe, but it 
may no longer be possible to do so. Today, being Jewish may be an ethnicity from 
which a privileged status can be constructed. Thus, in the social construction of 
reality there must be some objective point of reference that can be used, though 
how this objective reality is used is a product of struggles between classifiers and 
classified.
In this paper, we focus on Roma ethnicity. We believe that race is the 
product of classificatory struggles, thus, a) no assumptions should be made about 
common ancestry; b) empirically it is untenable that race (or ethnicity) can be 
determined with certainty by anthropological characteristics (like darkness of the 



























































































made even by many non-racist researchers (Kemeny 1976), namely, that all 
members of the society can agree with absolute certainty about who is member of 
any particular racial or ethnic group (for example, the Roma) is untenable. Who is 
Roma, Jewish, Hungarian, or Romanian is a result of classificatory struggles that 
involve both those who are classified this way and those who try to classify them. 
Thus, we argue that the object of our study should be the varieties of classificatory 
systems, not the “correct” way to determine who belongs to which group. This 
understanding of Roma ethnicity is closest to Okely’s work (1983), and also similar 
to the positions of Stewart (1997), Lucassen (1991), or Pronai (1995).
Empirical research conducted in Central and Southern Europe makes it very 
clear that estimates of the size of the Roma population depends on how the 
classifiers define ethnicity. Different systems of classifications have been used in 
different countries and in different studies: a) respondents were classified as Roma 
if they spoke the Romany language (this is what most censuses did before 1980); 
b) respondents were asked to identify themselves as belonging to Gypsy 
"nationality" (most censuses asked this question after the fall of communism); c) 
respondents were asked to identify the ethnic background of their ancestors 
(Szelenyi and Treiman survey, 1992); d) experts or jurors (school teachers, 
headmasters, social workers, doctors, the police) were asked to identify Gypsies in 
particular communities (Kemeny 1976, Kemeny, Havas, and Kertesi 1995; Tomova 
1995, Zamfir and Zamfir 1995); e) interviewers were asked whether they believed 
that respondents were definitely or possibly Roma (Szelenyi and Treiman 1992, 
Hungarian survey; Szonda Ipsos 1997; Hungarian Central Statistical Office 1993).
The size and composition of the Roma population in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovakia varies depending on how the Roma population is estimated. 
If individuals who self-identify as Roma are used as the benchmark, other estimates 
of the Roma population can be compared to the estimate obtained by using self- 
identification in the following way (these are rough figures, since estimates of the 
size and proportion of Roma population varies across countries).
If the number of individuals who self-identify as Roma equals 1, then:
the number of individuals whose native language is Romany is 0.5,
the number of individuals reporting Roma ancestors is 3,
the number of Roma reported by expert judges is 5,
the number that interviewers identify as definitely Roma is 6 or 7, and




























































































Thus, estimates of the Roma population vary between 0.5 and 10, or about twenty­
fold (Kemeny Havas, Kertesi 1995; Szelenyi and Treiman 1992; Szonda Ipsos 
1997).
Similarly, feminization of poverty occurs when women are concentrated in 
poverty and when biological, not social causes are proposed as the explanation of 
this concentration. When poverty is feminized, it becomes viewed as inherent: 
Young women with low intelligence and high fertility have many children, thereby 
creating a cycle of poverty. This image is often linked to what are assumed to be 
women's natural role in child raising activities. Becker (1991:37-48), for example, 
argues that child raising activities are biologically easier for women than men. As 
a consequence, he argues that it is rational for women to specialize in such 
activities. Poor women with many children are viewed as victims of biological 
processes of fertility and childbearing. Thus, the "welfare" mother is treated as a 
quasi-biological construction. In a process analogous to racialization, when poverty 
is feminized, it is presented as if it were a naturally occurring attribute of sex, that 
is, women’s biological capacities, instead of as a social construction.
Again, we try to find a position between objectivism aid subjectivism. While 
there are obviously some objective biological bases for women's role in 
reproduction, much of women's concentration in poverty is related to women's 
inferior market position with respect to men and to women's greater social 
responsibilities for child raising. There is some indication that in the United States, 
some women, and in particular, some female ethnic minorities, form an underclass 
(Casper, McLanahan, and Garfield 1994; Rodgers 1996; Stack 1976). Such women 
tend to become single mothers at a young age and for them poverty is not merely 
a life-cycle phenomena. They do not cease to be poor when their children reach 
adulthood, and their children are also more likely to be poor and remain poor. For 
our purposes, Central Europe is again a strategic research site - this time because 
poverty appears not to be feminized, at least not in the same way as in the United 
States.
During the transition from socialist redistribution to capitalist markets, the 
racialization and feminization of poverty followed different trajectories. Under 
socialism, Roma experienced discrimination. Still, however, they did not constitute 
an underclass -- though they were the most underprivileged group in these societies 
— because the socialist economy operated with full employment. Komai (1980), 
with great accuracy, called the socialist redistributive economy an "economy of 
shortage." While economies based on market capitalism suffer from cyclical crises 
of over-production - they have a chronic problem of excessive supply - socialist 




























































































shortages, even with respect to the allocation of labor. Threatened with chronic 
labor shortages, socialist societies institute laws that require individuals to be 
employed. Under these circumstances, there was sufficient demand for labor to 
draw Roma into the labor market, in addition to the legal compulsion requiring 
Roma to be employed. Thus, under socialism, Roma had access to a steady cash 
inflow for the first time in their history. Gypsies were employed where labor was 
in the most demand - precisely in the most privileged sectors of the economy, steel, 
mining, and construction, though racial prejudice slotted them into the most 
underprivileged positions. When socialism crumbled, these privileged bastions of 
the socialist economy were the hardest hit: what used to be the most privileged 
sectors of the economy became the least privileged ones. Thus, with the transition 
to capitalist markets, the Gypsies became the poorest of the poor. With the collapse 
of the mining, steel, and construction industries, Roma were the first to lose their 
jobs and had no hope for finding new employment (Barany 1994; Gheorghe 1991). 
This process is similar to the effect of de-industrialization in creating poor, Black 
ghettos in major American cities. De-industrialization in former socialist countries, 
however, has a much greater impact on the creation of a Roma underclass, because 
socialist ideology idealized those sectors in which the genuine proletariat, "the 
workers with hammers in hand", labored! Socialist planners were obsessed with 
"department one" and with the "production of the means of production" in a way 
that was unprecedented in market economies. As a result, when socialism 
collapsed, the Roma population moved out of the underprivileged stratum of the 
privileged economic sectors and into the underclass of post-communist society.
The Roma have become geographically isolated as well. One unusual pattern 
of geographic isolation in Central and Southern Europe are rural, ethnic ghettos. 
Although African-American ghettos in the U.S. are urban phenomena, Roma 
ghettos are found in villages. Rural ghettos are unique not only in comparison to 
the United States, but are also novel historical developments in Central and 
Southern Europe. Traditionally, the Roma minority - if settled, and in the successor 
states of the Austro-Hungarian empire it tended to be settled - lived in Gypsy 
settlements next to villages inhabited by ethnic majorities. During the past several 
decades, there was a dramatic ecological change in rural social spaces. The ethnic 
majority population began to escape small, isolated villages and moved into centers 
of rural growth or cities. The vacated spaces were filled by Roma, who were able 
to move out of the Roma settlements and into the villages. The housing conditions 
of Roma improved dramatically when they relocated, as they often moved out of 
mud huts in the settlements. Nevertheless, the flight of the peasant population from 
these isolated villages was disastrous for the Roma. Peasants in the villages 
mediated between the rural Roma poor and the rest of society. Peasants consumed 




























































































as musicians at weddings and funerals, and as seasonal laborers. Peasants also 
bought goods that Gypsies produced. The out migration of the peasants was, in 
many ways, analogous to the out migration of the Black middle class from urban 
Black neighborhoods in the United States. Historically, rural Roma lived in an 
asymmetrical, but symbiotic relationship with the peasants who belonged to the 
ethnic majority. When they lost these social ties, they were turned into a ghetto 
poor. Though the ethnic dimension is different, this process of the creation of a 
ghetto is similar to the way in which poor African-Americans were turned into an 
underclass because of the loss of their middle class.
Nevertheless, the overlap between rural residence, poverty, and ethnicity is 
not complete. Gypsy ghettos are also visible in the cities of Central and Southern 
Europe. These ghettos of urban Roma are created by a similar process, when those 
who are doing better economically escape the Roma neighborhoods. In addition, 
as Tarkowska (1998) indicates, poverty is prevalent in rural regions among the 
population of ethnic majorities in post-communist societies, because these regions 
experience little economic growth and suffer from the collapse of socialist state 
farms. Tarkowska argues that an underclass is formed if its members are socially, 
economically, and geographically isolated from the rest of the society. By her 
criteria, the Roma qualify as an underclass.
Like the social condition of the Roma, women’s position has beenchanging 
during the transition to capitalist markets. Their trajectories, however, differ 
dramatically. Women were also discriminated against in socialism. Unlike Gypsies 
who ended up at the bottom of the privileged economic sectors, however, women 
were locked into the underprivileged sectors of the socialist economy, though they 
were allowed to climb the social ladder in these sectors. Women were therefore 
substantially overrepresented in the tertiary sector, the orphan of the socialist 
redistributive economy. They were also excluded from the royal path to power and 
privilege: Communist party membership. Thus, they frequently compensated for 
their underrepresentation in the party, for their shortage of political capital, with 
higher levels of education. Indeed, by the end of the socialist epoch, women tended 
to be better educated than men. Though well-educated women often held relatively 
poorly paid and low prestige jobs in the tertiary sector, they were also employed in 
reasonably high positions in banking, insurance, advertising, tourism, and similar 
industries. In this respect, the market transition affected women in very different 
ways than Roma. When the transition to market capitalism occurred, women were 
concentrated in the sector that experienced the most growth. Furthermore, 
Communist party membership lost its prestige, so this form of political capital in 
which men were privileged lost its value, while education became more important. 




























































































themselves in good jobs with highly desired skills (Fodor 1997). As a result, at least 
in the early stages of market transition, there is little evidence of the feminization 
of poverty. In fact, the transition from socialist redistribution to capitalist markets 
benefits women, at least temporarily. As marketization proceeds, however, 
women's relative advantage may be eroded. Young men are rapidly entering the 
tertiary sector. It may take less than a generation for women to lose this relative 
advantage that accrued to them virtually by accident as a result of market transition.
While in the advanced Western capitalist economies, racialization and 
feminization are two parallel forces that accentuate the boundaries between the 
poor and the not-so-poor, during the epochal transition from socialism to 
capitalism, we hypothesize that racialization, but not feminization, creates an 
underclass. Thus, while racialization may prevent a long-term reduction in absolute 
poverty and may be apparent in the early stages of transition, feminization may not 
have the same effect or may take place at a much later stage in the transition.
This difference between the dynamics of feminization and racialization 
highlights two crucial issues. First, the feminization of poverty is not inevitable and 
is a social, not a biological construction. Second, it illustrates that both the 
institutionalist and the neoclassical theory suggest that markets have a singular 
effect, though the theories differ in the way that they characterize this effect. The 
institutionalist theorists argue that markets create a permanent underclass, while 
neoclassical theorists argue that they eliminate this type of poverty. Neither 
position, however, incorporates the historical trajectories of markets and, therefore, 
neither position captures the relative advantages of the socialist legacy for women 
that are specific to a transition from socialist redistribution to capitalist markets.
D. Transition to Market Economy: the "Laboratory" to examine the Effects 
of Marketization on Poverty
Societies in transition from socialist redistribution to capitalist markets provide an 
ideal site to consider hypotheses about the relationship between markets, inequality, 
and poverty. In these post-communist countries of Central and Southern Europe, 
there is an ideal, almost "laboratory"-like situation. Comparisons between these 
countries are a powerful tool to examine our hypotheses concerning the interactive 
effects of marketization, ethnicity, and poverty, because these countries vary along 
these dimensions. In terms of economic development and degree of market 
penetration, Hungary and Poland are more advanced than Slovakia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria. Poland is an ethnically homogeneous society, while Hungary is a country 




























































































show whether the presence of an ethnic minority that is concentrated in poverty 
creates an underclass. The comparison of Hungary with Slovakia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria (all of which have at least one ethnic minority) will suggest how much 
impact marketization has on the creation of an underclass. If neoclassical theory is 
correct, there should be no underclass in Hungary. If Roma poverty is similar in 
these four countries, our "revisionist" institutionalist theory will be supported.
There is another interesting comparison between the ethnically 
heterogeneous countries. Hungary has a single ethnic minority, while Romania and 
Slovakia have two minorities: Gypsies, who are concentrated in poverty and 
Hungarians, who are not. Thus, a comparison between Slovakia, Romania, and 
Hungary will help to explain how the presence of a second minority, which 
apparently has no elective affinity with poverty, affects the growth of a Roma 
underclass. Bulgaria falls into a unique third category. It is a multi-ethnic society, 
in which more than one ethnicity is overrepresented among the poor (Roma, 
Pomaks, and Turks are concentrated in poverty). With respect to our hypothesis 
about racialization, we expect to find little evidence of an underclass in Poland 
because the Roma population is small.
Thus, we hypothesize that there will be differences in the degree of 
underclass formation depending on how many ethnicities exist in a country and 
how many ethnicities have an elective affinity with poverty. We hypothesize that: 
a) if there is one ethnic group that is overrepresented among the poor, underclass 
development will be strong; b) if there are multiple groups over represented among 
the poor, underclass formation may weaker, since classificatory struggles using 
race to separate the poor and the not-so-poor cannot focus on a single group; c) if 
there are two ethnic groups, one that is concentrated in poverty and one that is not, 
the racialization of poverty may be especially strong. The ethnic group that is 
concentrated in poverty will be blamed, with particular force, for their own poverty, 
since the non-poor ethnic group will be cited as an example that ethnic minorities 
are not necessarily poor. If our hypotheses are correct, the racialization of poverty 
will be especially strong in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.
The comparisons between these countries also address our hypotheses about 
the feminization of poverty. Feminization may be more advanced when a) a racially 
defined underclass is less developed, because classificatory struggles can use only 
gender, not race, to mark poverty; and b) if marketization is more advanced, it may 
overcome the temporary advantage women had in the early stages of market 
transition. Thus, the feminization of poverty in these countries may increase with 
marketization. Consequently, the feminization of poverty will be strongest in 




























































































farthest underway, followed by Hungary, where marketization is also well 
underway, but which has a sizeable Roma minority.
Hypotheses for a comparative study of racialization and feminization of poverty
Marketization Ethnically
homogeneous
Ethnic group(s) likely to be poor: 
One group Several groups























E. The evidence from Central and Southern Europe
1/ Poverty
The comparison of poverty and inequality under socialism and post-communism 
is a complex task. Examining poverty was a taboo in communist societies (Ladanyi 
1998; Tarkowska 1998; Warzywoda-Kruszynska and Grotowka-Leder, 1996:68). 
In the reform oriented countries, such as Hungary and Poland, data were collected 
on low income groups during the socialist epoch, but this evidence is fragmentary 
(Bokor 1987; Ferge 1969; Frackiewicz 1983; Jarosz 1984; Kemeny 1972; Tulli 
1978; Tymowski 1973). Despite these incomplete data, scholars agree that both 
absolute and relative increased substantially after the breakdown of state socialism 
(Comia 1994; Kornai 1996; Ladanyi 1998; Magyari, Magyari-Vincze, Popescu, 
and Rotariu 1998; Milanovic 1994; Radicova and Vasecka 1998; Kornai 1996; 




























































































The causes of the increase in poverty and prospects for its amelioration are 
less obvious. Is an increase in poverty the price of transition? Is it the price 
societies pay for radical, but delayed, economic transformation (Mitev 1998)? Or, 
stated more theoretically, is there an inverted U-shaped curve describing the 
relationship between poverty and marketization during the post-communist 
transition? If so, then absolute poverty may increase during the early stages of 
marketization, but may decline as the economy grows and as fully developed 
market institutions restructure the economy. The existence of an inverted U-shaped 
curve of poverty during post-communist market transition would be consistent with 
Lai and Myint's theory of the relationship between economic growth and poverty. 
So far, there is no evidence of a Kuznets’s curve of income distribution in post­
communist transitional economies. As the economies of Hungary and Poland grow, 
inequality remains high and may even increase. Still, it is possible that there is a 
"Lai and Myint" curve: absolute poverty may be declining despite high inequality. 
Thus, the top income decile may earn an increasingly larger percentage of the total 
income, while the bottom decile may earn an increasingly smaller percentage of the 
total income, though those in the bottom income decile may still increase their 
absolute income. For example, Polish researchers report what appears to be a 
decline in the proportion of population under the poverty line, the turning point 
being somewhere around 1994-95 (Tarkowska 1998; Beskid 1997).
Although most scholars agree that poverty increased during first five years 
of post-communism, estimates of poverty vary substantially depending on how 
poverty is defined. One approach is to define poverty using a pre-established per 
capita income as a threshold level. Those who use this approach tend to produce a 
lower estimate of poverty, though the growth of the population falling below 
poverty line is substantial. Komai (1996), for example, defines as "poor" those who 
earn $4.00 a day or less, his estimates of poor in some of these countries are the 
following:
Table 1. Poverty measured by absolute income (S4.00 per day)


































































































Milanovic (1994) arrives at similar conclusions by using the monthly per capita 
income of $ 120 as the poverty line. He argues that the number of poor people in the 
region climbed from 8 million to 58 million between 1989 and 1993. The rate of 
poverty has increased in Poland and the Balkan from 5% to 17%, in the Baltic 
states from 1% to 30%, in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) 
from .5% to 1%.
Comia (1994), on the other hand, measures poverty in relative terms: as 
those earning less than a certain percentage of the median income of the given 
country. Using such measures the rate of growth of the population under the 
poverty line may seem less dramatic, but the actual proportion of poor is higher. 
Here are his estimates:
Table 2. Estimates of poverty (in % of the population)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Bulgaria
(45% of 1989 
average wage)
13.8 52.1 53.6 57.0
Hungary




(40% of 1989 
average wage)
24.7 43.1 41.2 43.7
Romania
(45% of 1989 
average wage)
33.9 21.4 29.7 51.5
Slovakia
(40% of 1989 
average wage)
5.8 9.4 27.7 34.1
As far as we know, the only survey with data for most of the Central and Southern 
European countries that used the same methodology on a large, random sample of 
the population is the study, “Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989", 
conducted by Szelenyi and Treiman (1992). Because of the methodology, it 
provides the most comparable data for these countries. Following the conventions 
of the literature and for reasons of comparability, they defined "poor" as those 
whose per capita household income was below 50% of the national median. This 
poverty line is a relative measure, because its monetary value differs in each 




























































































poverty in 1992 in Table 3. The results are consistent with Comia’s findings: The 
differences among the countries lies by and large in the same direction in Tables 
2 and 3, although the degree of difference among the countries is smaller in Table 
3. Thus, Bulgaria and Poland have the highest rates of poverty, followed by 
Slovakia and Hungary. Since the base here is 1992, not 1989 income, the poverty 
rate is lower. (In all countries, real incomes declined substantially between 1989 
and 1992, and the decline may have been the sharpest in Bulgaria and Romania. 
This may account for the astonishingly high poverty rate found by Comia in these 
two countries.)
Table 3. Poverty Rates for women and men, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 1992. 
Population between 20 and 69 years old (percentages, with N's in parentheses)
The extent of poverty within: Bulgaria Hungary Poland Slovakia
Whole Population 12.6% 9.0% 13.5% 10.9%
(567) (422) (421) (500)
Men 11.0 7.8 12.9 9.2
(237) (150) (205) (202)
Women 14.1 10.1 14.1 12.6
(330) (208) (216) (298)
Economically Active* 10.9 7.5 12.7 9.8
(361) (205) (309) (343)
Men 9.5 7.0 12.6 9.2
(162) (106) (168) (175)
Women 12.3 8.0 12.8 10.3
(199) (99) (141) (168)
Retired** 15.6 8.2 13.8 8.7
(137) (76) (62) (63)
Men 15.5 10.2 14.6 7.6
(57) (38) (28) (19)
Women 15.6 6.8 13.6 9.4
(80) (38) (34) (44)
On Maternity leave/ at home 25.5 27.1 26.2 32.3
(women only)
Ratio - Female to Male
(49) (67) (39) (81)
poverty (Whole population) 1.28 1.29 1.09 1.37
Note: N for the whole sample population of Bulgaria=4,485; Hungary = 3,987; Poland = 3,120; 
Slovakia = 4577.
The "poor" are defined as those whose per capita household income does not exceed 50% of the 
median national per capita income.
* Economically Active includes those working and looking for work.
** The Retired also includes those on long-term sick leave.





























































































In this paper, we focus on the Roma, because they are the single largest ethnic 
group found in the countries of Central and Southern Europe that is likely to be 
concentrated in poverty. According to Davidova (1995), the Roma population of 
Europe during the mid 1990s was about 8 million; perhaps over 5.5 million lived 
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia 
and Bulgaria. An additional 700,000 Roma lived in the other countries of the 
Central, Southern and East European region (Albania, other successor states of 
Yugoslavia, Russia and the Ukraine). Thus, almost 80 percent of Europe's Roma 
population can be found in the former socialist states of Europe. Aside from these 
countries, Spain and France are the only European countries with a substantial 
Roma population (750,000 and 340,000 respectively.) Davidova's estimates are 
rather conservative, so her figures may actually understate the size of the Roma 
population in the region:
Table 4. Estimates of the size of the Roma population in Central and Southern Europe





Bulgaria 230.000 600,000 700,000
Hungary 190,000 550,000 600,000
Poland 30,000 50,000 60.000




Romania 104,216 1,800,000 2,500,000
While the estimates for the 1950s and 1960s for Yugoslavia and Romania are 
highly dubious, it is reasonable to argue that the Roma population increased about 
three-fold over the past three to four decades. This population growth can be 
attributed solely to high levels of fertility and declining rates of mortality, because 





























































































Although it is likely that Roma are concentrated in poverty, there is very 
little statistical evidence to support this assertion. Szelenyi and Treiman’s study 
(1992) again provides one of the few sources. Table 5 below displays their findings 
for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia, for individuals reporting Roma ancestors 
(about 2.5-3.0 percent of the respondents). These data support the claim that Roma 
are concentrated among the poor, the uneducated, and rural residents. It also shows 
that they tend to have large families. Since Szelenyi and Treiman used a non- 
stratified, proportional random sample of the population, the "N" for the Gypsy 
minorities is small, which makes the relatively consistent results across these 
countries even more remarkable.
Table 5. Social characteristics of the Roma population in comparison with the non-Roma 
pauper population and the general population!










Bulgaria Roma 2.5 53.3 46.9 46.0
Pauper 1.8 45.9 20.4 19.9
All respond. .8 39.8 15.0 12.1
Hungary Roma 2.4 43.2 37.9 44.2
Pauper 1.8 41.4 18.6 20.0
All respond. .7 32.5 14.1 13.3
Slovakia Roma 2.3 43.9 30.5 27.6
Pauper 2.1 53.8 8.1 10.6
All respond. .9 47.5 8.9 6.1
1 The Szelenyi and Treiman Slovak survey grossly underestimates the percentage of unemployed 
- at the time of the survey it was twice as large as the study indicates. We assume that Gypsy 





























































































We can use Szelenyi and Treiman’s survey to consider the extent of the 
feminization of poverty as well. As discussed above, their measure of poverty is a 
relative one. They defined the poor as those whose per capita household income did 
not exceed 50 percent of the median national per capita household income in 1992. 
Since they use per capita household income, as opposed to individual earnings and 
benefits, the gender gap reflects differential poverty rates among single people. 
This is not only the conventional definition, but meshes well with social reality in 
Central and Southern Europe, because approximately 40% of the population over 
15 years of age is single at any one point in time (Statistical Yearbook of Hungary 
1990)2. Table 3 presents the gender difference in poverty, using this measure. Table 
6 presents another measure of poverty, "potential poverty rates," which we define 
as less than 50% of the national median individual income. This indicator shows 
how poverty would be gendered if all adults had to make ends meet on their own 
income - a real threat for many people, given the high rates of divorce. The two 
measures together, we believe provide a more differentiated picture of gendered 
poverty in the region, than either measure along. The last lines in Tables 3 and 6 
presents the ratio of female to male poverty.
Tables 3 and 6 illustrate that both the level of poverty and the gender gap 
differs across countries. In Poland, there is a high poverty rate, but little gender 
difference. In contrast, in Slovakia, the poverty rate is smaller, but the gender gap 
is larger. The poverty rate is higher in Bulgaria than in Hungary, but they have 
about the same size gender gap. A poverty ratio of 1.25 would rank around the 
middle of the distribution in Casper et al.'s eight-country study (1994:594): about 
the same as in Germany and Canada, lower than in the US and Australia, but higher 
than in Sweden, the Netherlands or Italy.
2 Whether or not income is distributed equally within households is another question. No reliable 




























































































Table 6. Potential poverty rates for men and women in five countries, 1992. Population 
between 20-69 years of age
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Slovakia
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
WHOLE
POPULATION
6.1 8.1 3.3 9.4 6.7 14.8 1.6 10.8
GENDER
RATIO
1.32 2.8 2.2 6.75
Note: N for whole populations of Bulgaria=4485; Czech Republic=5054; Hungary=3987; 
Poland=3121; Slovakia=4577.
As Table 3 shows, the gender gap in poverty is not limited to either the 
economically active or the retired: rates are quite similar in both categories. 
Poverty, even feminized poverty, does not have an "elderly" face in Eastern 
Europe; the retired are generally not worse off than those who are active in the 
labor force. Rather, the typical poor family consists of a wage earner father and a 
mother on maternity leave (or, less often, keeping house) - as indicated by the high 
rates of home makers living in poor households.
Women's plight is particularly apparent when we examine "potential 
poverty" rates in Table 6, which reflects differences in earning capacities in the 
labor market and illustrate women's dependence on a male breadwinner. The 
potential poverty rates in Tabl.e 6 are all higher than the actual poverty rates in 
Table 3, and dramatically so in Slovakia.
In sum, then, these figures show that the gender gap in poverty exists in 
Central and Eastern Europe, even though levels of state welfare spending as well 
as women's labor force participation rates are particularly high. This suggests that 
to understand gendered poverty, we must go beyond mere labor force participation 
rates and must examine, as Smith (1984) suggested, women's integration into the 
changing economy. The sizeable gender gap in poverty also suggests that women 
living alone or with children, even when they are working and receiving social 
benefits, are perhaps the most vulnerable group in post communist societies. In 
general, women's poverty in Eastern Europe has few of the "welfare mother" or 
"state-dependence" associations; instead it is related to the social organization of 
a system of production where women's wages are insufficient to support themselves 
and/or a family. Thus, as we suggested, the concentration of women in poverty may 




























































































elsewhere, because of the socialist legacy that provided women with some 
comparative advantages, though poverty does seem to be gendered. Our more 
specific hypotheses, that women are more likely to be concentrated in poverty; in 
the more marketized countries seems to hold, at least at a general level. Taken 
together, Tables 3 and 6 suggest that women may be less concentrated in poverty 
in Bulgaria, as we predicted. The small gender difference in poverty in Poland, 
however, is somewhat anomalous in terms of our hypotheses.
4/ The Interaction Between Ethnicity and Gender
Furthermore, not all women benefit from the legacies of communist "exploitative" 
emancipation. We argue that a significant bifurcation is emerging not only between 
the genders but also among women themselves. We expect this dual opportunity 
structure to be strongly associated with ethnicity, especially among the Roma. The 
interaction between gender and race create a double disadvantage for Roma 
women. Table 7 presents our evidence. Almost half of the Roma, while only around 
10% of the non-Roma population of the three countries for which data on ethnicity 
are available, live in poverty. But Roma women are even more likely than Roma 
men to be poor - by less than only 10% in Hungary, but by almost 40% in Bulgaria. 
Thus, we argue that one of the characteristics of the newly emerging poverty in 
Eastern Europe is that important differences are created among women. This 
bifurcation, we propose, is structured along racial lines: women at the very bottom 
of the social hierarchy are minority women, and in particular, those of Roma 
ethnicity.
Table 7. Poverty rates among the Roma population in three countries, 1992. 
Population between 20-57 years old
_____________ Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia
MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN
ROMA 40.4 55.3 41.4 44.3 32.1 35.8
NON-ROMA 10.0 12.5 7.0 10.6 9.4 13.3
RATIO FOR ROMA 1.37 1.07 1.11
N (ROMA) 61 46 42 49 57 48
Thus, we argue that while most women collected significant resources during the 
state socialist era, minority women could not do this, because they had been treated 
as a "welfare problem" even during the communist regime. To summarize our 




























































































primarily the result of the growth in the rate of single mothers or the insufficiency 
of welfare checks, rather it is due to women's inferior position in the labor markets. 
However, (2) we added that women's poverty, on average, is not the kind of 
hopeless destitution experienced by women on welfare in the United States, 
because East European women had gained some resources in the communist era, 
which turned out to be marketable during the transition to a market economy. But, 
not all women can do this: (3) minority women, devoid of the above-mentioned 
resources are the most vulnerable social group, they are thrust to the fringes of 
society and experience downward mobility as no other segment of the society.
F. Conclusions
We use this theoretical perspective and the available evidence from Central Europe 
and Southern Europe to make these hypotheses:
1/ If the neoclassical position is correct, the relationship between economic growth 
and poverty will follow an inverted U curve. As marketization proceeds, poverty 
will increase for awhile, but eventually the benefits of economic growth generated 
by the market economy will trickle down to the poor, decreasing absolute poverty.
2/ By incorporating the perspective of Mitev (1998) and Radicova and Vasecka 
(1998) into the neoclassical framework, it is possible to argue that a gradualist 
strategy of market transition may initially delay the growth of poverty, but when 
poverty begins to increase, it may actually reach higher levels than under 
conditions of "shock therapy." Thus, we can imagine two inverted U curves with 
slightly different shapes and heights, depending on whether the transition was 
gradual or sudden. In the case of shock therapy, we expect rapid growth of poverty 
early in transition. The height of the U curve, however, may be relatively low, and 
the curve may decline rapidly after peaking. Such a curve may describe well the 
dynamics of poverty in Poland and Hungary: It increased rapidly right after 1989, 
but peaked as early as 1993, and declined gradually in the past five years. In 
countries that followed gradualist policies (Romania and Bulgaria), the growth of 
poverty may have been smaller and slower during the early years of the transition 
(in Romania poverty probably declined right after 1989), but poverty continued to 
increase after it began to decline in Poland and Hungary. Furthermore, in Romania 
and Bulgaria, absolute poverty may have been higher than where shock therapy 
was implemented.
3/ We also hypothesize that the presence of an ethnic minority affects the shape of 




























































































and therefore, to create an underclass. We argue that the racialization of poverty is 
likely to occur when as the U curve begins to decline. Without racialization, 
poverty may decline monotonically. With racialization, this decline may stop if an 
underclass emerges that reproduces itself and consequently perpetuates absolute 
poverty. While we do not expect that feminization will have strong effects at this 
stage of marketization, it is possible that feminization and racjalization may have 
analogous effects on the shape of the U curve describing the relationship between 
marketization and poverty.
We can summarize the different ways that poverty fe constructed under the 
conditions of the market transition in Central Europe. How does racialization and 
feminization alter the theoretical controversy between traditional institutionalist and 
neo-classical economists? If there is an ethnic minority in a society that has an 
elective affinity with poverty, there will be a tendency towards the formation of an 
underclass, depending upon the outcome of the classificatory struggle. Where such 
an underclass develops, it is less likely that absolute poverty will be reduced as 
market institutions develop and as economic grpwth occurs. When poverty is 
feminized, an underclass may also develop that inhibits the elimination of absolute 
poverty. Racialization and feminization of poverty, however, are strongly affected 
by access to labor markets. In the transition from socialist redistribution to capitalist 
markets, the historical legacy of socialism may provide some advantages for 
women on the labor market, at the same time it disadvantaged the Roma. These 
historically specific attributes of markets are missed by both the institutionalist and 
the neoclassical economists.
(January 15, 1999)
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